



Reflections in the Mirror: Authoritarian Values and Political Identities in Turkey

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Research Questions

- ❑ Is the success of populist authoritarian politicians attributable to heresthetics? (Riker 1986)
- ❑ Is there an enduring legacy of authoritarianism?
- ❑ What is the interaction between supply and demand of authoritarian values?
- ❑ What are the determinants of authoritarian attitudes among the electorate?
- ❑ Are there temporal limitations associated with the determinants, and consequently what increases the salience of authoritarian values at certain points in time?


Autocratization

- ❑ Waves of Democratization and Autocratization
- ❑ Third Wave of Autocratization (Luhmann and Lindberg 2019)
- ❑ APSA Organized Section on Comparative Democratization
- ❑ Populism and Authoritarianism
- ❑ Research by Chesterley and Roberti (2017), Ruth (2018), Inglehart and Norris (2017, 2019), Ruth-Lovell et al. (2019), Akkerman et al. (2014), Bonikowski (2017)
- ❑ Centralization (Linz 1990)
- ❑ Religion and democracy (Yavuz 2002, Bukay 2007, Wright 2015, Kalin 2001, Fish 2002, Norris and Inglehart 2011, Arat 2005, Gole 1996, Caprioli 2005)
- ❑ Social capital (Newton 2001, Paxton 2002, Zmerli and Newton 2008, Sander and Putnam 2010)
- ❑ “Authoritarian International” (Way 2015, von Soest 2015)

A Dynamic Theory of Authoritarian Values

- ❑ Building Block 1: The Incumbents, “Agent”
 - ❑ Research by Riker (1986), Agh (2016), Bayulgen et al. (2018), Esen and Gumuscu (2016)
- ❑ Building Block 2: Supply and Demand Framework
 - ❑ Research by Sunar (1990, 1995), Aytac and Elci (2019), Yavuz (2002)
- ❑ Building Block 3: Institutional Setup and Legacy
 - ❑ Research by Sunar (1995)
- ❑ Building Block 4: Religion
 - ❑ Research by Mardin (1973), Yavuz (2002), Adorno et al. (1950), Sunar and Toprak (1983), Kalaycioglu (2007), Shin (2012), Berkes (1964), Arat (2005), Gole (1996), Caprioli (2005)
- ❑ Building Block 5: Social and Economic Conditions of Individuals
 - ❑ Research by Sunar (1995)
- ❑ Building Block 6: Contextual Factors
 - ❑ Research by Bonikowski (2017), Sunar (1995)

A Dynamic Theory of Authoritarian Values



Hypotheses

H₁: Religious denomination has an effect on the magnitude of authoritarian values. Members of majority sect are more likely to have authoritarian values, whereas members of minority sect are less likely to have authoritarian leanings.

H_{1a}: Religiosity has a positive effect on the magnitude of authoritarian values.

H₂: Educational attainment has a negative effect on the presence of authoritarian values.

H₃: Partisans of Right parties have higher levels of authoritarian leanings.

H₄: Gender has an effect on authoritarian values. To the extent that they are free from patriarchal structures, women are less likely to have authoritarian values.

H₅: Employment status has an effect on authoritarian values and this effect should be mediated by the sector and nature of the occupation.

H₆: The level of social capital has a negative effect on authoritarian values at the individual level.

Dependent Variables (Authoritarian Values)

Dimensions of Authoritarian Values (N=2,455)

Item:	Factor I	Factor II	
	Eigenvalue	Eigenvalue	
	2.95	1.25	
% squared loadings (after rotation) Cumulative	29.20%	23.40%	52.60%
The best way to prevent war is being as powerful as the enemy.	0.73	0.10	Use of Force Scale
Use of armed forces should be allowed for maintaining law and order.	0.71	0.14	
Political parties/groups which endanger the social order may be banned from politics.	0.68	0.04	
Use of force may be necessary to preserve our traditional lifestyle.	0.57	0.30	
The majority may abolish the minority rights, if they desire to do so.	0.58	0.13	
People who consume alcohol should not dine in the same place with people who perform salat.	0.01	0.84	Social Order Scale
People who have bad habits should not live in the same place with the good people.	0.00	0.82	
In incidents such as protests, strikes, etc. the governors may obstruct transportation if they deem necessary.	0.33	0.56	

Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis.



Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Reliability Check





Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.70$ (Factor 1)

Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.68$ (Factor 2)

Distribution of Dependent Variables



Distribution of Political Identities



Independent Variables

- ❑ Religion: Dummy variable, base category is “others”.
- ❑ Religiosity: Ordinal variable, 4 values, increasing.
- ❑ Gender: Dummy variable, female=1.
- ❑ Affiliation with Associations: Dummy variable, affiliation=1.
- ❑ Growing Up in Rural Area: Dummy variable, rural area=1.
- ❑ Residence in Rural Area: Dummy variable, rural area=1.
- ❑ Educational Status: Ordinal variable, 3 values, increasing.
- ❑ Educational Status – Father: Ordinal variable, 3 values, increasing.
- ❑ Educational Status – Mother: Ordinal variable, 3 values, increasing.
- ❑ Work status: Dummy variable, base category is “civil servant”.
- ❑ Partisanship: Dummy variable, base category is “undecided”.
- ❑ Ethnicity: Dummy variable, base category is “others”.
- ❑ Regions: Dummy variable, base category is “Istanbul”.
- ❑ Age: Interval level variable.
- ❑ (log) Income: Natural logarithm of monthly income, interval level variable.

Geographical Regions of Turkey



4 Major Parties of Turkish Politics

□ Parties of the Right:

- AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – Justice and Development Party)
- MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – Nationalist Action Party)
- İYİ (*İyi Parti* – Good Party) [2017 - to the People Alliance]

□ Parties of the Left:

- CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – Republican People's Party)
- BDP (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi* – Peace and Democracy Party) [after 2014, the party merged to HDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* – People's Democratic Party)]

Method

- ❑ OLS Regression Analysis as suitable method for cross section analysis as of 2014 due to continuous dependent variables (factor scores of the two dimensions of authoritarian values).
- ❑ The two dimensions will also serve as robustness checks for the results.
- ❑ The models were checked for collinearity with VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) analysis.
- ❑ Robust standard errors are utilized to address heteroskedasticity.
- ❑ Unstandardized coefficients are used due to the multi-faceted nature of the inquiry.
- ❑ KONDA Research Agency

Results

Correlates of Authoritarian Values in the Turkish Electorate

Predictor Variables	Use of Force		Social Order		Use of Force		Social Order	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Religiosity	0.163***	0.036	0.371***	0.038	0.151***	0.038	0.291***	0.150
Female	-0.146*	0.060	-0.191**	0.062	-0.095	0.062	-0.141*	0.064
Age	-0.002	0.001	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.003	0.002
(Log) Income	-0.070†	0.039	-0.004	0.040	-0.100*	0.042	0.009	0.042
Growing Up in Rural Area	-0.070	0.049	0.163**	0.050	-0.090†	0.050	0.157**	0.051
Residence in Rural Area	0.079	0.052	-0.023	0.062	0.061	0.054	-0.009	0.062
Educational Status	-0.168***	0.042	-0.122**	0.044	-0.140**	0.044	-0.070	0.046
Educational Status - Father	-0.029	0.051	0.093	0.059	-0.023	0.052	0.107†	0.060
Educational Status - Mother	-0.151*	0.072	-0.100	0.080	-0.096	0.073	-0.082	0.081
Affiliation with Associations	-0.240**	0.072	-0.145*	0.064	-0.186**	0.071	-0.136*	0.066
<i>Religion</i>								
Sunni Muslim	0.767***	0.170	0.271†	0.148	0.629***	0.162	0.257†	0.150
Alevi Muslim	0.154	0.189	0.181	0.170	0.103	0.189	0.392*	0.172
<i>Work Status</i>								
Private sector	0.249*	0.119	0.005	0.121	0.259*	0.123	0.007	0.124
Worker	0.348**	0.119	0.081	0.121	0.315**	0.121	0.052	0.124
Small Retailer	0.499***	0.128	-0.042	0.127	0.490***	0.129	-0.077	0.129
Industrialist / Businessman	0.020	0.281	-0.092	0.226	0.044	0.265	-0.055	0.230
Self-employed	0.747***	0.174	0.830***	0.193	0.719***	0.183	0.832***	0.210
Farmer, Stock Breeder	0.104	0.143	0.132	0.142	0.104	0.147	0.087	0.143
Works, other	0.216	0.135	0.117	0.140	0.228	0.143	0.123	0.151
Retired	0.318**	0.116	-0.010	0.123	0.291*	0.122	0.004	0.126
Housewife	0.233*	0.113	0.329**	0.121	0.179	0.119	0.237†	0.126
Student	0.176	0.123	0.082	0.126	0.203	0.126	0.111	0.129
Unemployed	0.729***	0.137	-0.114	0.156	0.731***	0.134	-0.119	0.155

(continues)


Results

Correlates of Authoritarian Values in the Turkish Electorate


Predictor Variables	Use of Force		Social Order		Use of Force		Social Order	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Disabled	0.006	0.292	-0.446†	0.230	0.074	0.299	-0.507	0.208
<i>Partisanship</i>								
AKP					0.240***	0.066	0.420***	0.067
CHP					0.008	0.075	-0.186*	0.076
MHP					0.543***	0.087	-0.069	0.092
BDP					-0.367**	0.140	-0.046	0.118
<i>Ethnicity</i>								
Turkish	0.182†	0.105	0.039	0.103	-0.016	0.108	-0.023	0.119
Kurdish	-0.290*	0.132	-0.016	0.120	-0.236†	0.139	-0.036	0.139
Zaza	-0.535*	0.239	0.191	0.218	-0.628**	0.233	0.109	0.229
Arab	0.276	0.202	0.149	0.197	0.063	0.199	-0.021	0.212
<i>Regions</i>								
Marmara	-0.189*	0.078	-0.209**	0.079	-0.140†	0.081	-0.172*	0.082
Aegean	-0.008	0.071	0.025	0.073	-0.048	0.073	0.063	0.075
Mediterranean	0.268**	0.091	0.080	0.087	0.166†	0.091	0.172†	0.092
Central Anatolia	0.075	0.109	-0.118	0.112	-0.034	0.113	-0.142	0.115
Black Sea	0.227**	0.086	0.057	0.088	0.183*	0.088	0.048	0.087
Eastern Anatolia	-0.587***	0.113	0.149	0.110	-0.598***	0.117	0.232*	0.119
Southeast Anatolia	-0.126	0.106	0.176†	0.099	-0.089	0.109	0.224*	0.100
Constant	-0.303	0.414	-1.316**	0.409	-0.043	0.054	-1.434**	0.442
R-squared	0.22		0.17		0.26		0.23	
Number of Observations	1,884		1,884		1,724		1,724	

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with robust standard errors. OLS Regression Analysis where the dependent variables are the two dimensions of authoritarian values extracted by principal components factor analysis. Models were checked for multicollinearity. For religion, base category is others. For work status, base category is civil servant. For ethnicity, base category is others. For regions, base category is Istanbul. For partisanship, base category is undecided.

Marginal Effect of Employment Status Conditioned By Religiosity



Marginal Effect of Educational Status Conditioned By Religiosity



Implications, Limitations, and Further Research

- ❑ Root cause of autocratization in one of the worst case scenarios
- ❑ Islam and authoritarianism
 - ❑ Gender
 - ❑ Small business
 - ❑ Cognitive dissonance
- ❑ Islam and democracy
- ❑ Research by Solt (2012)
 - ❑ Income inequality at the macro level
 - ❑ Determinants at the individual level
 - ❑ Hierarchical Linear Model to combine the effects of macro and micro level variables
 - ❑ Structural Equation Model solution of the non-recursive model as depicted here



THANK YOU

“O kadar dayak yemişler ki, doğru düşünemiyorlar.”

“They have been beaten down by life so much that they can not think straight anymore.”