

**A Theory of Gender's Effect on Vote Shift  
Supplementary Information**

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## Appendix A Choropleth Maps (Vote Share)

Figure 1 shows the vote distribution of IYI in 2018. We see that support for IYI is concentrated in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Marmara regions. We see the same pattern for the Black Sea coastal region to a lesser degree. The support has a similar distribution in the Eastern and Western Black Sea regions. Central Anatolia also shows a mixed distribution as there are districts with high as well as low levels of support. We can see from the map that in the Middle Eastern, Northeastern, and Southeastern Anatolian regions the distribution of support is uniform and at low levels.

[Figure 1 about here.]

2018 election was the first for IYI. However, there are four more parliamentary parties which saw shift in their support between the previous election in 2015 and 2018. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the change in vote shares of AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP from top to bottom. There are some observations worth noting: First, all parliamentary parties have increased their vote share in Southeastern Anatolia and Middle Eastern Anatolia regions which have an ethnic Kurdish dominance. HDP is the only party to see vote share loss in its stronghold. Second, AKP has seen vote loss in virtually all Western regions and Black Sea region. The only noticeable vote gain for AKP is seen at the Western Aegean region. Third, we see that CHP has managed to increase its vote share in Northeastern Anatolia region and chunks of Central Anatolia region. Fourth, we see that the nationalist far-right MHP has lost support heavily in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Marmara regions. Finally, we see the ethnic based HDP increasing vote share in virtually all regions of Turkey outside Southeastern and Middle Eastern Anatolia regions. While it is true that in some cases, this increase is from an unnecessarily low base from the previous election, their total vote gain was more than enough to compensate for their heavy vote loss in Southeastern and Middle Eastern Anatolia regions. They maintained parliamentary representation and even increased their vote share by 1%. It is this resilience that I propose an explanation to in this study.

[Figure 2 about here.]

## Appendix B Educational Gender Gap

There is a discrepancy between the educational attainment levels between males and females in a majority of countries. When electoral contests are run in multiple electoral districts as is the case in this study, the distribution of educational gender gap needs to be taken into account. Educational gender gap is a heuristic variable and combines input from both observed and unobserved variables at the district level. The utility comes from this aspect. When we use theoretical components of educational gender gap instead of this variable, we will only capture part of the explanation. The robustness checks illustrate this last point.

The aggregate level of educational gender gap from 1985 to 2018 is shown in figure 3. Although we see a spike from 2000 to 2008, subsequent years have registered a decline and on the national level educational gender gap is lower in 2018 than 1985. However, the aggregate level hides significant variation at the subnational level, which is critical to have a finer understanding of trends.

[Figure 3 about here.]

## Appendix C Robustness Checks

The first robustness checks address potential concerns as to whether the results are a product of econometric model choice. In the analysis, I use spatial error models. I run the same models as OLS and spatial lag models. Table 1 lists the OLS estimation results for IYI models and table 2 lists the spatial lag estimation results for the IYI models. The results do not change, supporting the view that the results I presented in the analysis are not a product of modeling choice.

[Table 1 about here.]

[Table 2 about here.]

I run the models of highest placement of female candidates using OLS and spatial lag as well. Table 3 lists the OLS estimation results and table 4 lists the estimation results of spatial lag models. In both models, we see that the interaction term accounting for the additional implication about the emphasis of women candidates is significant and the results are not different from the spatial error models presented in the paper.

[Table 3 about here.]

[Table 4 about here.]

I argue that the main indicator of interest, educational gender gap, is a heuristic variable tapping observed and unobserved variables in a district. I further argue that one of these variables is socio-economic development. Therefore, if we substitute educational gender gap with socio-economic development index at the district level, we should see that the direction of the relationships stays the same as reported in the paper. Magnitudes will change as socio-economic development index is but one part of the bigger educational gender gap variable. Table 5 lists the estimation for this check for IYI and we see that as theorized socio-economic development index has a positive association with IYI vote share across three models. We only see one significant interaction term, which supports the contention that as a component, this variable is only capturing part of the effect we aim to capture with educational gender gap. Table 6 lists the estimation results for the HDP models. We see that socio-economic development index is positive and significant across all models as theorized. However, we see only one significant interaction term as this variable can capture only a portion of the factors tapped by educational gender gap. The main result from these checks is that the results we are arriving at is not a product of a specific independent variable operationalization as a component is demonstrating largely the theoretically expected relationships.

[Table 5 about here.]

[Table 6 about here.]

In the paper, I use the vote loss of other parties to demonstrate to calculate the predicted vote share of IYI in the section on magnitude of effects. There might be concerns that the uncovered effect is due to the omission of vote gains. If the effect I demonstrate in the paper about IYI is true, then it must be the case that when we run the same marginal effects analysis using vote gains we will see a corresponding effect. This is indeed what we find in this robustness check. In figure 4 I present the predicted vote share of IYI as vote share gain for CHP and MHP and educational gender gap change. In each case, we see that as the educational gender gap increases, fewer of the votes gained by these parties translate into loss for IYI. This can be seen by the decreasing slopes as we go from the panels on the left to the panels on the right. This provides substantiation for the analysis provided in the paper.

[Figure 4 about here.]

The last robustness check has to do with winnable slots. I used the highest ranked female candidate variable to demonstrate the effect of incorporating gender and its interaction with the educational gender gap at the district level to drive vote shift to HDP. If the results in the main analysis are to be trusted, it must be the case that we see the same effect when we take into account the number of winnable slots occupied by women in the party lists. I do this robustness check by running a spatial error model including the number of winnable slots for HDP and pitting it against the other parties (controlling for the number of winnable slots occupied by the other parties at the same district). Table 7 lists the estimation results. We see a significant positive effect of the number of winnable slots for HDP vote share when run against the other parties in the four models in the table. Educational gender gap variable is not significant across the models, however when we look at the interaction of educational gender gap and the number of winnable slots, we see negative and significant effects across all four models. The negative interaction coefficients mean that the effect of the number of winnable slots decreases as the educational gender gap increases in a district. This provides another evidence that the results offered in the paper are not due to specific variable choices.

[Table 7 about here.]

## **Appendix D Women Candidates in Winnable Slots**

The number of women candidates and the ranking of candidates are straightforward measures I use in the paper. For ranking, I use the highest placed candidate in a district as the indicator in line with my theoretical argument. However, as I pointed out in the main text, the number and placement do not show chances of election *per se*. Therefore, I also used the number of winnable slots and I ran the same models for HDP using this new variable as an additional robustness check. The results stayed the same. In this section, I provide an explanation of how I calculated this variable.

In 2015, Turkey had two parliamentary elections, in June and November. Between these two elections, there was a significant change in vote share (mostly at the expense of the opposition). It would be hard to justify a decision to base the expectations of parties for the 2018 election on either of these two parliamentary elections in 2015. Therefore, in gauging the parties' expectation of their vote share in the 2018 election, I used an average of the vote shares of the parties at the district level from these two elections. In 2018, the number of MP's increased from 550 to 600. In order to partially account for this change and to incorporate fighting slots to the sum, I rolled averages upwards when they came up at half points. Because IYI split from MHP in 2017, I used the same expectations I used for MHP when calculating the number of women candidates in winning slots for IYI. The expectations formed thus largely map onto the actual women MPs elected from party lists for all parties in the 2018 election.

## **Appendix E Choropleth Maps (Candidate Placement)**

Number of female candidates, highest ranking of female candidates, and the number of female candidates in winnable slots are presented in the paper. I illustrated the centrality of highest ranking of female candidates for HDP. As the discussion of these characteristics is necessarily condensed in the paper, I present choropleth maps of them for the interested reader who would like to have a visualization of the distribution of these variables. This appendix also complements the other choropleth maps offered in the

paper and in other appendices like educational gender gap, IYI vote share and the change in vote share of the other parliamentary parties between 2015 and 2018.

The unit of analysis in the paper is the administrative districts which make up the electoral districts. The administrative structure of Turkey comprises 81 electoral districts. There are 973 administrative districts. Using administrative districts allows for a fine-grained analysis as there is variation on all variables at the administrative district level. This includes the vote as vote is counted and reported at the administrative district level. In keeping with the main analysis of the paper, I present data visualization at the administrative district level first. After that, I present further visualization at the electoral district level for the interested reader who might wish to see an aggregate level representation of these variables. In order to make the appendix more tractable, I combined maps to make fewer figures. As the focus is on IYI and HDP, I combined maps of these two parties into one figure and I combined the maps of the other parliamentary parties, namely AKP, CHP, and MHP into another figure.

Figure 5 and figure 6 show the spatial distribution of the number of female candidates fielded by parties. We see that both IYI and HDP emphasized coastal regions in the number of candidates. IYI did not field any female candidates in parts of Eastern, Southeastern, and Central regions whereas HDP did not have any female candidates in parts of Western Marmara and the Blacksea regions. A key distinction is that HDP placed more candidates in Istanbul than IYI. A noteworthy observation is that despite the opposite ideological stances of CHP and MHP, they are similar in the low number of female candidate placement. However, the patriarchal structure is more evident in the distribution for MHP candidates.

[Figure 5 about here.]

[Figure 6 about here.]

Figure 7 and figure 8 show the spatial distribution of the highest position of female candidates in party lists. We can see in figure 7 that IYI placed female candidates at the highest positions in the lists in parts of Aegean and Western Marmara region. We can also observe that HDP went a step beyond IYI and the highest placed candidates for this party can be found in Western as well as Eastern Marmara region



and in wider swathes of the Aegean region. The lowest placement of a female candidate for HDP was at the fifth slot whereas for IYI this was seventh slot. The lowest placed candidates for HDP was in the Central Anatolia region whereas for IYI this is seen in the Southeastern Anatolia region.

A look at figure 8 provides a visualization of the difference between IYI and HDP on one hand and the other parliamentary parties on the other hand. When we further compare CHP and MHP with AKP, we see that the lowest placement of female candidates is seen in MHP and CHP lists. Whereas AKP has higher placement in limited parts of Western Marmara and Aegean, we see an opposite with CHP and MHP. MHP map makes it clear that even in the Western regions, there are lots of locations missing a female candidate. This might be explained by the ideological stance of MHP as a far-right party with a tradition of patriarchal power structures.

At this point, it might be suitable to remind the reader that IYI split from MHP and in a very short period of time was able to drastically change traditional candidate placement patterns. The biggest drastic change is definitely the female leadership of this splinter party. The changes are all the more telling as many former members of MHP transferred to IYI. This is to say that whatever the reasons change is possible.

We also need to consider CHP. The patriarchal structure of CHP is clearly seen in the distribution of the ranking of female candidates. Although this party is the main secular opposition party, the placement of female candidates shows a pattern of lip-service for women in politics in Turkey. This is apparent in the low placement of candidates on the lists. The potential of gender is demonstrated in the paper. The failure of CHP to tap into this potential by refusing to alter their candidate strategies is putting an effective upper limit to the electoral fortunes of this party. In a case of democratic backsliding as bad as the one experienced in Turkey, opposition vitality is crucial and electoral fortunes of opposition parties have system-side consequences. The analysis of the paper suggests that CHP deploying similar strategies in a directed way might help control the backsliding.

[Figure 7 about here.]

[Figure 8 about here.]

This discussion is to be complemented by a visualization of the number of female candidates in winnable slots in party lists. Figure 9 and figure 10 show the spatial distribution of these data. A look at figure 9 shows that IYI had one candidate in winning slot in the Mediterranean region and Istanbul, whereas HDP had as many as 3 candidates in winnable slots in Southeastern Anatolia, which might partially explain HDP's vote loss in their traditional stronghold. The reader is reminded that this variable was calculated based on placement for this election only. A look at the maps for AKP, CHP, and MHP reveal that AKP placed more candidates in winning slots and the other two parties show a similar distribution of the number of candidates in winnable slots.

[Figure 9 about here.]

[Figure 10 about here.]

I use administrative district as the units of analysis for a fine-grained look, whereas electoral districts are fewer in number and comprise several administrative districts. The following maps display the same data as with the previous ones, but with the electoral districts. These are offered as further visualizations for the interested reader who might want an aggregated view.

[Figure 11 about here.]

[Figure 12 about here.]

[Figure 13 about here.]

[Figure 14 about here.]

[Figure 15 about here.]

[Figure 16 about here.]

## Appendix F Variables Used in the Analysis

Table 8 lists the variables used in the analysis together with coding, expected relationships, and sources.

[Table 8 about here.]

## Appendix G Gender Gap in Comparative Perspective

Finally, it is important to emphasize the importance of not considering the case of Turkey in isolation. When we put Turkey in comparative perspective with respect to gender gaps, it will be apparent it is one of many countries that share a gap at various levels. That is to say, the fact that Turkey is one of the worst examples of autocratization in the world does not constitute a scope condition for further applicability of my theory. More important criterion would be the extent of gender gaps in countries. The subnational distribution of these has the potential to contribute to our understanding of gender in politics.

World Economic Forum has been publishing Global Gender Gap Reports since 2006 and as their methodology remains the same, the data is suitable to look at as time series. In addition to the overall gender gap index, they have sub-indices. The index scores vary between 0 and 1, with zero denoting complete inequality and 1 complete equality. I use the general index as well as two sub-indices of political empowerment and economic participation of women to demonstrate the development of Turkey's score over time in comparison to the global sample average and Turkey's rank. The coverage of this report has been expanding since its inception, so the number of countries in the global sample shows some variation especially in the early years of the report.

Figure 17 shows the time series of political empowerment index for Turkey in comparison to the sample average. We can see that the average score for this sub-index is particularly low but increasing. The score for Turkey has hovered around the .1 mark since 2012.

[Figure 17 about here.]

Figure 18 shows the time series of economic participation index for Turkey in comparison to the sample average. We can see that Turkey reached the score in 2006 again in 2013 after a dip starting with 2007. The global average is stable and hovering around the .6 mark and there is more than .1 difference between the scores.

[Figure 18 about here.]

Figure 19 shows the time series of the overall gender gap index for Turkey in comparison to the sample average. The overall global index has gone from 0.65 to 0.68 between 2006 and 2018. Turkey had a score of .585 in 2006 and reached .63 in 2018, trailing the global average with a margin of .05.

[Figure 19 about here.]

Table 9 lists the ranking of Turkey with respect to the specific sub-indices and the overall gender gap index score considered above. The sample size has grown from 115 countries in 2006 to 149 countries in 2018 and except for the political empowerment score of 2006, 2010, 2011, and 2012 Turkey was not ranked below 100 in any of the indices. The significant results illustrated in the analysis for 2018, when Turkey ranked 113<sup>th</sup> out of 149 countries in political empowerment shows that the theory developed in the paper about the role of gender in vote shifts has potential wide applicability in the world.

[Table 9 about here.]

Table 1: IYI Party Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
Educational Gender Gap	-12.1*** (2.41)	-10.2*** (1.59)	-6.18*** (1.04)	-8.05*** (1.48)
AKP Vote Share 2015	.008 (.013)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018	.106 (.069)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap	-.172 (.224)			
CHP Vote Share 2015		-.114*** (.018)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018		-.664*** (.089)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap		.5* (.245)		
MHP Vote Share 2015			.3*** (.019)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018			-.412*** (.036)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap			.533*** (.134)	
HDP Vote Share 2015				-.108*** (.011)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018				-.424*** (.119)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap				.0317 (.264)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.224** (.070)	-.29*** (.069)	-.131** (.044)	-.311*** (.068)
Margin of victory	-.074*** (.008)	-.090*** (.01)	-.013* (.005)	-.075*** (.008)
ln(District Population)	-.218 (.150)	-.321* (.14)	-.086 (.102)	-.013 (.145)
District Dependency Ratio	-2.66*** (.605)	-3.06*** (.585)	-1.39*** (.384)	-1.94*** (.539)
District Youth Bulge	-.29*** (3.13)	-.32.4*** (3.4)	-.14.5*** (1.86)	-.22.1*** (3.29)
Constant	26.8*** (1.95)	30.5*** (1.84)	13.5*** (1.32)	22.8*** (1.75)
<i>N</i>	969	969	969	969
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.428	0.478	0.732	0.479

Note: OLS model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of IYI. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 2: IYI Party Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
Spatial lag	.709*** (.023)	.680*** (.024)	.487*** (.024)	.678*** (.025)
Educational Gender Gap	-5.194*** (.994)	-4.094*** (.856)	-2.797*** (.735)	-3.248*** (.916)
AKP Vote Share 2015	-.010 (.009)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018	.029 (.034)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap	-.106 (.091)			
CHP Vote Share 2015		-.065*** (.012)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018		-.363*** (.055)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap		.327* (.147)		
MHP Vote Share 2015			.205*** (.014)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018			-.267*** (.026)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap			.258** (.098)	
HDP Vote Share 2015				-.050*** (.008)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018				-.222*** (.066)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Educational Gender Gap				.043 (.115)
Mosque density	-.018 (.052)	-.094 (.051)	-.041 (.039)	-.095 (.050)
Margin of victory	-.038*** (.006)	-.054*** (.006)	-.010* (.004)	-.045*** (.005)
ln(District Population)	.040 (.098)	-.012 (.097)	.065 (.080)	.142 (.100)
District Dependency Ratio	-1.807*** (.376)	-2.102*** (.374)	-1.180*** (.293)	-1.521*** (.373)
District Youth Bulge	-4.971* (2.035)	-8.437*** (2.231)	-2.597 (1.599)	-3.356 (2.368)
Constant	8.721*** (1.303)	11.212*** (1.392)	4.762*** (1.051)	7.149*** (1.285)
<i>N</i>	969	969	969	969
Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.464	0.524	0.739	0.518

Note: Spatial lag model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of IYI. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 3: HDP Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
HDP Vote Share 2015	.912*** (.006)	.914*** (.006)	.916*** (.006)	.914*** (.007)
Educational Gender Gap	-3.75* (1.59)	-1.87 (1.31)	-3.27 (1.97)	-6.3*** (1.85)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	-.305* (.125)	-.379** (.12)	-.369* (.179)	-.499** (.153)
Educational Gender Gap 2018 × Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	1.96*** (.514)	1.86*** (.474)	1.69 (.887)	2.76*** (.642)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (AKP)	-.023 (.0476)			
Highest Position of Female Candidate (CHP)		.0678* (.0343)		
Highest Position of Female Candidate (MHP)			.0722* (.0351)	
Highest Position of Female Candidate (IYI)				-.0664 (.0566)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.295*** (.065)	-.321*** (.0637)	-.309*** (.066)	-.195*** (.058)
Margin of victory	-.0045 (.0055)	-.0015 (.0049)	.0038 (.0066)	-.0007 (.005)
ln(District Population)	.243*** (.0675)	.298*** (.0649)	.222** (.0747)	.305*** (.0686)
District Dependency Ratio	.587 (.399)	-.148 (.309)	-.238 (.367)	.235 (.319)
District Youth Bulge	-14*** (2.32)	-12.5*** (2.22)	-12.7*** (2.94)	-12.4*** (2.84)
Constant	1.27 (.975)	1.04 (.921)	2.14* (1.01)	1.26 (.98)
<i>N</i>	699	691	527	781
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.992	.991	.991	.99

Note: OLS model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of HDP. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 4: HDP Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
Spatial lag	.00516 (.012)	.00745 (.0106)	-.0357* (.014)	.00913 (.0112)
HDP Vote Share 2015	.908*** (.0097)	.91*** (.0082)	.942*** (.0118)	.907*** (.0090)
Educational Gender Gap	-3.76* (1.68)	-1.88 (1.51)	-3.44 (2.24)	-6.34*** (1.31)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	-.30 (.170)	-.373* (.156)	-.405 (.224)	-.494** (.162)
Educational Gender Gap 2018 × Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	1.95** (.643)	1.84** (.589)	1.77 (1.02)	2.76*** (.576)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (AKP)	-.0223 (.0484)			
Highest Position of Female Candidate (CHP)		.067* (.0283)		
Highest Position of Female Candidate (MHP)			.0739* (.035)	
Highest Position of Female Candidate (IYI)				-.0647 (.0549)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.295*** (.0502)	-.322*** (.0448)	-.299*** (.0508)	-.197*** (.0377)
Margin of victory	-.0044 (.0043)	-.0013 (.0040)	.0021 (.0046)	-.00053 (.0041)
ln(District Population)	.244** (.0805)	.299*** (.0717)	.204* (.08)	.306*** (.0717)
District Dependency Ratio	.572* (.284)	-.172 (.272)	-.19 (.308)	.216 (.253)
District Youth Bulge	-14.3*** (1.98)	-12.8*** (1.83)	-11.2*** (2.2)	-12.8*** (1.71)
Constant	1.3 (.995)	1.10 (.901)	2.13* (1.07)	1.32 (.887)
<i>N</i>	699	691	527	781
Pseudo $R^2$	0.992	0.991	0.992	0.990

Note: Spatial lag model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of HDP. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table 5: IYI Party Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
Socio-Economic Development Index	.651** (.224)	.548** (.196)	.151 (.123)	.417* (.165)
AKP Vote Share 2015	-.0049 (.012)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018	.0228 (.033)			
Change in AKP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Socio-Economic Development Index	.0121 (.0205)			
CHP Vote Share 2015		-.0598*** (.017)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018		-.371*** (.052)		
Change in CHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Socio-Economic Development Index		.0023 (.036)		
MHP Vote Share 2015			.305*** (.0191)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018			-.237*** (.0189)	
Change in MHP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Socio-Economic Development Index			-.044** (.0151)	
HDP Vote Share 2015				-.103*** (.011)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018				-.165* (.065)
Change in HDP Vote Share, 2015-2018 × Socio-Economic Development Index				.00962 (.045)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.0825 (.0728)	-.131 (.0718)	-.0626 (.0513)	-.157* (.068)
Margin of victory	-.0416*** (.008)	-.052*** (.008)	-.0081 (.005)	-.0372*** (.007)
ln(District Population)	.281* (.144)	.258 (.140)	.261* (.106)	.344* (.138)
District Dependency Ratio	-1.95*** (.507)	-2.22*** (.511)	-.979** (.373)	-1.77*** (.486)
District Youth Bulge	-15.5*** (3.13)	-17.1*** (3.39)	-9.58*** (2.28)	-10.4** (3.19)
Constant	14.4*** (1.56)	15.8*** (1.76)	6.69*** (1.15)	13.2*** (1.44)
$\lambda$	.758*** (.023)	.75*** (.024)	.705*** (.0256)	.737*** (.022)
$N$	869	869	869	869
Pseudo $R^2$	0.381	0.438	0.715	0.447

Note: Spatial error model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of IYI. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 6: HDP Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
HDP Vote Share 2015	.91*** (.005)	.918*** (.005)	.92*** (.006)	.91*** (.005)
Socio-Economic Development Index	.423* (.183)	.442* (.173)	.493* (.213)	.639*** (.191)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	.135 (.106)	.0785 (.095)	.118 (.139)	.143 (.092)
Socio-Economic Development Index × Highest Position of Female Candidate (HDP)	-.167 (.089)	-.155 (.0849)	-.207 (.109)	-.27** (.0929)
Highest Position of Female Candidate (AKP)	-.00425 (.0626)			
Highest Position of Female Candidate (CHP)		.08* (.038)		
Highest Position of Female Candidate (MHP)			.0456 (.045)	
Highest Position of Female Candidate (IYI)				-.0495 (.066)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.222*** (.050)	-.221*** (.044)	-.211*** (.049)	-.144*** (.039)
Margin of victory	-.00646 (.00459)	-.00209 (.004)	.000186 (.00476)	-.00147 (.004)
ln(District Population)	.163 (.084)	.111 (.0806)	.182* (.0868)	.267** (.084)
District Dependency Ratio	.0785 (.302)	-.332 (.292)	-.338 (.335)	.0928 (.286)
District Youth Bulge	-12.7*** (2)	-10.6*** (1.92)	-10.7*** (2.2)	-11.9*** (1.78)
Constant	1.61 (.930)	2.17* (.873)	1.41 (.988)	.187 (.866)
$\lambda$	.486*** (.041)	.377*** (.04)	.378*** (.051)	.325*** (.042)
$N$	599	591	443	681
Pseudo $R^2$	0.993	0.993	0.993	0.991

Note: Spatial error model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of HDP. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 7: HDP Vote Share in 2018

Predictor	I	II	III	IV
HDP Vote Share 2015	.905*** (.006)	.905*** (.006)	.905*** (.006)	.905*** (.006)
Educational Gender Gap	.517 (.692)	.517 (.691)	.521 (.691)	.536 (.691)
Number of Winnable Slots (HDP)	1.58*** (.292)	1.58*** (.287)	1.58*** (.287)	1.62*** (.291)
Educational Gender Gap × Number of Winning Positions (HDP)	-4.22*** (.862)	-4.22*** (.851)	-4.22*** (.851)	-4.29*** (.856)
Number of Winnable Slots (AKP)	.0048 (.09)			
Number of Winnable Slots (CHP)		.0414 (.18)		
Number of Winnable Slots (MHP)			-.0144 (.268)	
Number of Winnable Slots (IYI)				-.271 (.371)
Mosque density (per 10,000)	-.226*** (.036)	-.225*** (.036)	-.226*** (.036)	-.226*** (.036)
Margin of victory	.0029 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)
ln(District Population)	.277*** (.067)	.276*** (.066)	.277*** (.067)	.279*** (.066)
District Dependency Ratio	-.629* (.258)	-.635* (.259)	-.63* (.259)	-.631* (.258)
District Youth Bulge	-11.9*** (1.65)	-11.8*** (1.66)	-11.9*** (1.64)	-11.9*** (1.64)
Constant	1.62 (.853)	1.62 (.854)	1.62 (.853)	1.63 (.852)
$\lambda$	.556*** (.031)	.556*** (.031)	.556*** (.031)	.554*** (.032)
$N$	969	969	969	969
Pseudo $R^2$	0.990	0.990	0.990	0.990

Note: Spatial error model estimation results. Outcome variable is vote share of HDP. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Variables, Coding, Expected Relationships and Sources

Variable and Summary Statistics	Expectation	Coding and Sources
<i>IYI Vote Share 2018</i> : $\mu=9.687$ , $\sigma=5.243$ , range=0.5–27, $N=970$	Outcome variable	District vote share of IYI (TUIK)
<i>HDP Vote Share 2018</i> : $\mu=10.378$ , $\sigma=18.171$ , range=0–86.5, $N=970$	Outcome variable	District vote share of HDP (TUIK)
<i>HDP Vote Share 2015</i> : $\mu=10.413$ , $\sigma=21.14$ , range=0–95.8, $N=969$	↑ Higher lagged vote share will lead to higher vote share for HDP	District vote share of HDP (TUIK)
<i>Educational Gender Gap 2018</i> : $\mu=0.224$ , $\sigma=0.139$ , range=-0.127–1.358, $N=970$	↓ Higher educational gender gap will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Calculated by the author as the ratio of educational attainment to district female population (TUIK)
<i>Educational Gender Gap 2015</i> : $\mu=0.242$ , $\sigma=0.137$ , range=-0.11–1.49, $N=969$	↓ Higher educational gender gap will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Calculated by the author as the ratio of educational attainment to district female population (TUIK)
<i>Socio-economic Development Index</i> : $\mu=0.02$ , $\sigma=1.00$ , range=-2.01–7.95, $N=869$	↑ Higher socio-economic development will lead to higher vote share for IYI and HDP	Socio-economic development index of province and regions report 2011 (RTMD)
<i>Change in AKP Vote Share</i> : $\mu=-7.379$ , $\sigma=6.371$ , range=-36.5–12.9, $N=969$	↔ Change in AKP vote share is not expected to have any effect on IYI and HDP	Difference between the vote shares at the 2018 and 2015 elections (TUIK)
<i>Change in CHP Vote Share</i> : $\mu=-2.057$ , $\sigma=3.438$ , range=-18.6–11.3, $N=969$	↑ Vote loss by CHP will lead to higher vote share for IYI and lower share for HDP	Difference between the vote shares at the 2018 and 2015 elections (TUIK)
<i>Change in MHP Vote Share</i> : $\mu=-0.362$ , $\sigma=6.470$ , range=-23.9–32.3, $N=969$	↑ Vote loss by MHP will lead to higher vote share for IYI and HDP	Difference between the vote shares at the 2018 and 2015 elections (TUIK)
<i>Change in HDP Vote Share</i> : $\mu=-0.039$ , $\sigma=3.358$ , range=-22.2–18.1, $N=969$	↑ Vote loss by HDP will lead to higher vote share for IYI	Difference between the vote shares at the 2018 and 2015 elections (TUIK)
<i>Margin of Victory</i> : $\mu=28.665$ , $\sigma=16.972$ , range=0–82.5, $N=970$	↓ Higher margin of victory will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Difference between the vote shares of first two parties at the district level (TUIK)

*Continued*

Table 8 – *Continued*

Variable and Summary Statistics	Expectation	Coding and Sources
<i>District Magnitude:</i> $\mu=7.972$ , $\sigma=6.544$ , $\uparrow$ range=1–35, $N=973$	District magnitude will positively affect IYI and HDP for female candidates	Number of MPs per district (YSK)
<i>(ln) District Population:</i> $\mu=10.457$ , $\sigma=1.316$ , $\uparrow$ range=7.487–13.733, $N=970$	Larger districts will positively affect IYI and HDP vote share	Natural log of district population (TUIK)
<i>District Dependency Ratio:</i> $\mu=1.361$ , $\sigma=0.279$ , $\downarrow$ range=0.360–2.789, $N=970$	Higher dependency ratio will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Calculated by the author as the ratio of population 0–14yrs to 15–24yrs (TUIK)
<i>District Youth Bulge:</i> $\mu=0.195$ , $\sigma=0.063$ , $\downarrow$ range=0.070–0.484, $N=970$	Higher youth bulge will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Calculated by the author as the ratio of population 15–24yrs to 15+yrs (TUIK)
<i>Mosque Density:</i> $\mu=2.838$ , $\sigma=2.526$ , $\downarrow$ range=0.07–20.05, $N=973$	Higher mosque density will lead to lower vote share for IYI and HDP	Calculated by the author as the number of mosques per 10,000 people (DRA)

*Note:* TUIK: Turkstat; DRA: Republic of Turkey Directorate of Religious Affairs; YSK: Supreme Election Council, RTMD: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development.

Table 9: Turkey's Rank in Global Gender Gap Reports, 2006–2018

	Sample	Gender Gap Index	Economic Participation	Political Empowerment
2006	115	105	106	96
2007	128	121	118	108
2008	130	123	124	106
2009	134	129	130	107
2010	134	126	131	99
2011	135	122	132	89
2012	135	124	129	98
2013	136	120	127	103
2014	142	125	132	113
2015	145	130	131	105
2016	144	130	129	113
2017	144	131	128	118
2018	149	130	131	113

Note: Sample column shows the number of countries included in the calculation of the indices in a particular year.

Source: World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, 2006–2018.




Figure 1: IYI Party Vote Share, 2018




Figure 2: Change in Vote Shares of Parliamentary Parties, 2015-2018

*Note:* From top to bottom, change in vote share of AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP are shown. Shades of red denote loss and shades of green denote increase in vote share.






Figure 3: Educational Gender Gap (nationwide), 1985–2018

*Note:* Calculated by the author based on education data from TUIK.




Figure 4: Predicted Vote Share of IYI

*Note:* Graphs show the effect of vote *gain* by other parties on IYI vote share being moderated by educational gender gap under scenarios of lower (panels a&d), mean (panels b&e), and higher (panels c&f) levels of educational gender gap. The y-axis shows the predicted vote share of IYI, whereas the x-axis shows that vote gain of CHP (panels a-c) and MHP (panels d-f).




Figure 5: Number of Female Candidates Fielded, 2018

Note: Maps show the number of female candidates fielded by IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 6: Number of Female Candidates Fielded, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of female candidates fielded by AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).




Figure 7: Highest Ranking of Female Candidates, 2018

Note: Maps show the highest position in the party list for candidates of IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 8: Highest Ranking of Female Candidates, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the highest position in the party list for candidates of AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).




Figure 9: Number of Female Candidates in Winnable Slots, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of candidates in winnable slots for IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 10: Number of Female Candidates in Winnable Slots, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of candidates in winnable slots for AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).






Figure 11: Number of Female Candidates Fielded, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of female candidates fielded by IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 12: Number of Female Candidates Fielded, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of female candidates fielded by AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).




Figure 13: Highest Ranking of Female Candidates, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the highest position in the party list for candidates of IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 14: Highest Ranking of Female Candidates, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the highest position in the party list for candidates of AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).




Figure 15: Number of Female Candidates in Winnable Slots, 2018

*Note:* Maps show the number of candidates in winnable slots for IYI (top) and HDP (bottom).




Figure 16: Number of Female Candidates in Winnable Slots

*Note:* Maps show the number of candidates in winnable slots for AKP (top), CHP (middle), and MHP (bottom).




Figure 17: Political Empowerment Scores, 2006–2018

*Note:* The time series is calculated from World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports.




Figure 18: Economic Participation Scores, 2006–2018

*Note:* The time series is calculated from World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports.






Figure 19: Global Gender Gap Scores, 2006–2018

*Note:* The time series is calculated from World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports.